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The Moro Problem

By

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Manila, Philippine Islands

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THE MORO PROBLEM

An Academic Discussion of the History and
Solution of the Problem of the
Government of the Moros of
the Philippine Islands

by

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PREFACE

The following monograph on the Moro Problem is an academic paper which was read by the author before the Philippine Academy at Manila, in January, 1913. It is neither political in its character, nor intended as a criticism of any policy whatsoever. It is simply published to express the author's views on a question of absorbing interest and unusual difficulty which may soon require fresh consideration by the Philippine government.

The pagan hill tribes of Mindanao are not savages. They all possess tribal organization, and fairly well-recognized customs that have the force and value of laws, which, it is firmly believed, if well studied by the proper officials can form definite bases for governmental reorganization. Simple and crude as such tribal organization may be, it naturally is capable of development, and can be gradually modified and improved until it can be made to assume a municipal form of government.

The Moros are considerably ahead of the pagans in the scale of civilization. They have well-defined governmental organization and a well recognized knowledge of written law. It is wrong to deal with them as savages, and it is very unwise to ignore their form of government. It is the chief purpose of this monograph to demonstrate the existence of such basic Moro governmental organization, and the practicability of its adoption and gradual development into a municipal form of government. Such a solution will naturally throw a new light on the general problem of the government of non-Christian tribes, and should therefore be given due consideration.

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THE MORO PROBLEM

PART I

The History of the Moro Problem.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The solution of the Moro problem is much more difficult than that of the Philippine problem proper. The difficulties of the Philippine problem, as they presented themselves in 1900, were chiefly political. The difficulties of the Moro problem are physical. At the time we occupied the Philippine Islands the Christian Filipinos had already been civilized by Spain. The basic institutions of civilization as expressed by modern laws, governmental organization, general education, and social culture had already been established among them. The Christian Filipinos had made that preliminary progress in social development which is necessary to fit them for the adoption of European institutions and forms of government. Our difficulties in ruling them hinged principally on the amount of power they could be given as their share in the administration of the Philippine government. But it is not so with the Moros. These have not yet developed sufficiently for the adoption of modern forms of government. Their social condition is essentially different from ours, and this difference is not in degree or in form, it is a difference in kind. The Moros have not attained the proper degree of civilization, or the proper stage of culture that modern institutions require. Further, they do not believe in equal rights among men, nor do they treat women on the same basis as men. So far, they have been independent in the management of their own internal affairs and they have maintained their own tribal organizations up to the present day. They do not know our institutions and naturally they do not want them. They have different ideas on religion and social conditions and they hate to be molested in the exercise of what they consider their own liberties and rights. They are perfectly willing to remain as friends and neighbors, but they resent a forceful adoption into what seems to them a distasteful foreign family to which they recognize no blood relation whatsoever.

We can not understand the Moro question well or form a correct judgement on Moro affairs from a mere consideration of present conditions and observations. Before the American met the Moro, the Spaniard had set the American's mind in a prejudiced attitude toward the Moro. Before the Moro met the American, his heart throbbled with fear lest his new neighbor would treat him as the Spaniard did. American officials do not speak any of the Moro dialects, but they all read and understand Spanish. Review the history of the latter days of Spanish occupation of Moroland and you will be surprised at the strong resemblance the American occupation bears to the Spanish. There are many differences in details and in

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minor actions, but the main general policy is the same. A correct understanding of the history of Moroland and the relation the Moros held to Spain are therefore necessary for correct understanding of the Moro's temper and the problem his government presents.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE MOROS.

Moro history and Moro nationality owe their beginning in the Philippine Islands to two noted persons; Abu Bakr in Sulu and Kabungsuwan in Mindanao. For the sake of brevity and clarity in the discussion of the main subject, we will leave Kabungsuwan out of consideration and center our attention on Abu Bakr. This remarkable man was a Mohammedan Arabian born in Mecca. He came to Sulu about 1450 A. D. as a mere trader and settled at Bwansa, the ancient capital of the island. He soon found favor with Raja Baginda, the local chief, became his judge and high priest, and married his only daughter. At the death of Baginda his talented son-in-law, Abu Bakr, assumed the reins of government under the title of the Sultan of Sulu, and proceeded to form a new kingdom. He taught the former priests Arabic and the Quran, built mosques, and baptised the chiefs and the masses as Mohammedans. He organized the state, assigned the territories and duties of chiefs, and levied taxes and tribute from all of them. He reformed the laws of the people, prepared and published the first code, and established a system of courts. He united the various districts and islands into one empire and joined all the diverse elements of the Sulu Archipelago into one nation. He administered to the souls and bodies of his subjects and instilled a new life into their being.

The dynasty founded by Abu Bakr ruled with a firm hand and attained considerable power and fame. The new organization, establishing law and order, consolidated the forces of the state, and increased its influence on the outside world. Islam added a new element of strength and another stimulus to campaign and conquest. The Sulus never exceeded 60,000 in number, yet we learn that, prior to the arrival of Magellan, their power was felt all over Luzon and the Bisaya Islands, the Celebes Sea, Palawan, North Borneo, and the China Sea, and their trade extended from China and Japan, at one extreme, to Malacca, Sumatra, and Java at the other.

What Abu Bakr did for Sulu was probably greater than what Raja Brooke did for Sarawak, though we have never stopped to think of Abu Bakr in this light. Great as the achievements of Abu Bakr were, yet greater they should seem to us if we pause to consider the light which they throw on the possibility of reform in Sulu and what a nation like the United States may be capable of doing.

From 1450 to 1578 A. D. the Sulus lived unmolested and thrived and prospered. But after the latter date they seemed destined to go through a different experience. The Moros watched the progress of Legaspi at Cebu, Panay, and Luzon, saw how the pagan chiefs were subjugated, and witnessed the expulsion of their brother Mohammedans from Manila. They had played this role themselves, and when the enemy reached their shores they needed no word of explanation or stimulus to resist. Bent on conquest and expansion,

Spain soon turned her attention towards the Moros and made fierce and repeated attempts to subdue them. One expedition after another was sent to Sulu and Mindanao to destroy, burn, and kill. Thousands of Moros were hunted with bullets and swords and hundreds of towns were leveled to the ground and sacked. Spain instigated hostilities and coveted the Moros' domain. It was not the Moros' part to yield. Their love of home and family naturally prompted them to fight, and they did fight well and valiantly.

THE MORO CHARACTER

The Moro is a Filipino Malayan of prominent type, reared in his infancy by Hinduish panditas and brought up to maturity under the care of Mohammedan priests. He rejected his idols as early as 1450 and had been for more than a century prior to the arrival of Legaspi at Cebu, a faithful and devoted worshiper of "Allahu Ta'ala", the Almighty God, according to the teaching of the prophet Mohammed and the holy Quran. He had laws, an organized government, an alphabet, and a system of education. By trade he was planter and fisher, and both land and sea yielded him plenty. He turned the timber of his rich forests into boats and utilized the currents of the sea and the movements of the wind. Navigation came natural to him, and he sailed to distant lands and traded his pearls for silks and spices. He had a fair range of experience and his knowledge of the world was by no means restricted to one island or to one limited group of islands. True, the Moros had no standing army or navy, but they had innumerable boats, forts, and firearms and every able-bodied man was a soldier and a sailor, always armed, and always ready for a call to arms. His immediate neighbors were pagans, who paid him homage and tribute. He was the master of the land and the lord of the southern seas. He was chivalrous in his manners, and received his friends with liberal hospitality; but he wasted no sympathy or kindness on his enemy. The enemy of the state was also an enemy to "Allahu Ta'ala," and no life was deemed too dear to sacrifice for the cause of home and God. It was the idea of his home that during hostilities started the blood rushing through his veins, and religion fittingly fanned the flame and heated his blood to the boiling point. There is honor even among thieves, and a nation born of fierce pirates need not go begging for dignity, gallantry, and self-pride. Let the Moro be idolatrous or a fire worshiper and he will "go juramentado" on the strength of his faith in wooden or fire gods before he yields to a master or serves as a slave. He would die rather than surrender. Such mettle is what makes the Moros brave, independent, and unyielding.

THE MAIN PICTURE

The vivid picture presented by the history of Moroland thrills its readers with scenes of horror, cruelty, and misdirected energies. On one page we read how rich and mighty Spain stretched her hand across the border of her domain into the territory of her weak neighbors and coveted their jewels and treasures, and being refused, struck

terror and desolation in their homes. On another page we read how, as if possessed by mighty demons, her weak and petty neighbors summoned the powers of the wind and sea to their aid, marched upon their strong enemy in the night, assaulted her while unaware, robbed her house, and carried her people away. Mighty Spain wakened again in the morning and in her rage cursed her wretched neighbors and swore vengeance upon them. She assembled her valiant warriors, and unfurled the sails of her gigantic fleet; but the mighty sea rolled and the furious winds blew, and the giant did not prove a match for the weak, for man can not go against nature, and valor is a poor aid against overwhelming odds. Yet some men's hearts are made of stone and one or two experiences do not daunt them; so we see the same scene repeated time and time again, until a late moment arrived, when nature in the form of steam power took sides with mighty Spain and turned the scales against the Moros.

So we learn that for 270 years natural advantages remained on the side of the Moros and the Spanish forces could accomplish no permanent results in spite of their superior methods of warfare and excellent military organization. But after 1848 A. D., the introduction of steam war vessels in the Spanish navy and modern artillery in their army put to disadvantage all Moro sailing craft and kept the Moros on the defensive in all future warfare. The Spanish forces began to occupy Moro territory and pushed the war inland. Moro resistance, however, continued with unabated tenacity and the Spaniards paid too dearly for every point of vantage they won. Not an inch of ground was gained without fighting, and not a year passed without blood shed.

THE POLICY OF GENERAL AROLAS

Matters reached their climax in Sulu in the days of Governor Arolas, the famous builder of the town of Jolo. Governor Arolas was an able commander of troops and a man of unusual integrity. He had an exalted opinion of Spanish sovereignty in Sulu, and tried to assert the same by forcing the Sulus to recognize the sultanate of Datu Harum who was not the choice of the people but the appointee of the Spanish government. This the people refused to do and the Sulu chiefs resorted to arms for the defense of their rights and the protection of their institutions.

Governor Arolas marched against their capital, Maybung, at once. Forty Moros were killed on the way before the town was reached. The forts of Maybung were demolished, its walls were razed to the ground, and the whole town was reduced to ashes. Out of a large force of Sulus defending the fort and town, 250 lay dead after the battle was over. Colonel Arolas was highly praised at Manila and Madrid and was soon promoted to Brigadier-general.

If military operations, war, and death are efficient measures to daunt the Sulus, coerce their will, and make them yield to superior authority, this Maybung campaign should certainly have produced the desired result. Many thought that the moral effect of this victory was excellent beyond measure and for that reason enter-

tained great hopes. Governor Arolas felt that the cause of Spanish sovereignty was amply vindicated and Spanish honor strongly and proudly upheld. But as early as the 9th of May, 1887, two or three months after the battle of Maybung, another fight stared him in the face. Arolas and Sultan Harun had to march against Parang and invest the kuta (fort) of Panglima Damang. After the surrender of Damang an expedition was sent to Lati and another to Tapul Island. This latter campaign was extremely difficult and trying. The country was rough, the forest thick, and the enemy fierce. Panglima Sayadi did not recognize Harun's sultanate and did not obey the mandates of the governor of Sulu, so his chastisement was decreed and Tapul was attacked. Sayadi and his men fought like tigers at bay, and Governor Arolas was compelled to lead his troops in person. Sayadi was defeated after two days fighting, 90 of his men were killed, and the fort was demolished. The Spanish casualties were 13 dead and 155 wounded.

On the 29th of July, Pangyan Inchi Jamila presented herself at Jolo and expressed her submission and that of her son, Raja Muda Amirul Kiram, to the governor of Sulu and to Sultan Harun. Governor Arolas insisted that Amirul Kiram should come in person and express his surrender, and allowed him ten days in which he could come in with safety and impunity. After her return Pangyan Inchi Jamila sent Sultan Harun the seal of the sultanate, but neither the chiefs nor Amirul Kiram agreed to the personal surrender requested. Governor Arolas was disposed to make Spanish sovereignty over Sulu a fact, absolute and complete, and required implicit obedience. The Sulus had a different view of the respective rights of the two governments and continued their resistance.

Another campaign was necessary on Siasi Island, and Datu Hiyang and many Moros were killed. Another expedition was directed against Kadungdung and southern Lu'uk and another against the Island of Pata. Innumerable hardships were sustained by the Spanish troops and many Moros were killed. Sultan Harun and his forces cooperated with the Spanish forces and reconnoitered inaccessible places. The partisans of the young Raja Muda Amirul Kiram were supposed to have been completely vanquished and the young prince was expected to humiliate himself before Sultan Harun at any time. Such hopes were, however, false, for on October 30, Bwal and the northern Lu'uk district had to be reckoned with. After some fighting the Sulus evacuated Bwal and fled to the mountains and 53 houses were reduced to ashes. Nor was this sufficient, for in 1888 expeditions amounting in some cases to 1,500 troops, comprising from two to four companies of artillery, were conducted against the following districts of Sulu Island:—Purul, Tambang, Patikul, Taglibi, Buhanginan, Pandan, Sari'ul, and Pigi-Dahu. Hundreds and probably thousands of Sulus were killed, but notwithstanding that, Arolas's cruel efforts to force Sultan Harun upon the people resulted in failure. The Sulus scorned Sultan Harun and his apparent supremacy, persisted in their resistance, and kept their allegiance to Amirul Kiram. True to their traditions they remained faithful to the candidate whose right to the succession was in their

opinion and conviction stronger than any other claim though backed by the forces of General Arolas.

Apparently the worthy cause of peace, and Sulu welfare, were completely overlooked, while the main object of asserting power and supremacy was pressed and prosecuted at the expense of a thousand souls and war with every strong chief throughout the whole Archipelago. Governor Arolas trampled on the treaty, assumed arbitrary and absolute authority, and treated noncompliance with his wishes as disloyalty and insurrection. This attitude might have been due to his military training and peculiar ideas, but it was certainly unjust and overbearing. Nations can not be trampled under foot without bringing about resentment and retaliation, and people can not be treated as privates in a company of disciplinarios or deportados. The result of coercion is hatred, and the effect of abuse is enmity. Such methods do not tend to civilize a country or better its chances of progress. They kill ambition, harden the heart, and dull the senses. The first step of a subordinate nation toward progress is imitation of its superior; but imitation is generally engendered by admiration and kindly influences, and cruel warlike measures are certainly disposed to kill such good agencies.

THE CLOSING EVENTS OF THE SPANISH ADMINISTRATION OF SULU.

Sulu military operations ceased soon after the arrival of Governor-General Weyler in Manila, and some of the Jolo forces were withdrawn. General Arolas left Jolo in 1893, and was succeeded by Colonel Cesar Mattos, who was in turn followed by General Venancio Hernandez before the end of the same year. The successors of General Arolas did not have similar motives for upholding Harun's sultanate against overwhelming odds. They saw in him a weak and vacillating sultan who was a burden to the state. Consequently Sultan Harun was relieved in 1894, and he returned to his home in Palawan.

THE STATUS OF SULU IN 1899.

The cause for which Governor Arolas shed the blood of several hundred Christian soldiers and killed some thousands of Moros was utterly defeated. The tenacity with which the Moros resisted Spanish domination, their obdurate opposition, their bravery in battle, and their obstinate passive resistance in peace, baffled all Spanish efforts to subvert their political organization. The Sulus succeeded at last in inaugurating their candidate as Sultan of Sulu. Their laws and the administration of their internal affairs were not interfered with. Their religion, social conditions, national usages and customs were unaffected by any change whatsoever. Spanish influence and jurisdiction did not extend beyond the limits of the garrison and no material reform or progress reached the Moro community through that channel. No effort was made by Spain to educate the Sulus and no adequate measure was proposed by her Sulu governors which was applicable to the needs of the Sulus and acceptable to their ideas. The Sulus felt that there was a strong inclination on the part of the

Spanish government or some of its recognized agents, to destroy their national unity, and consequently they never had complete confidence in Spanish officers and representatives and repulsed every influence that tended to establish close relations between them and the Christians of the Spanish garrison.

No tax or tribute was collected from the Moros, and their territory was exempted from the operation of the laws of the Philippine Islands. Sulu imports could come in Sulu craft free of duty and unhampered by any regulation. Duties could be collected by the Sultan of Sulu at all ports unoccupied by Spain; and if hostilities could have been brought to an end, the Sulus, in their pursuit of the peaceful vocations of life, might have felt no appreciable difficulty or inconvenience from Spanish occupation of Sulu, except the loss of the revenues of the ports of Jolo and Siasi and some control over the trade of the Chinese.

Piracy was completely suppressed in 1878, but slavery remained an established institution of the land and its continued practice among the Moros was neither vigorously denounced nor effectively restricted. The pearl industry remained in the hands of the Sulus and pearl fishers and shell dealers paid a variable tax to the sultan and the local chiefs.

THE EFFECT OF WAR ON MORO GOVERNMENT.

Before the campaign of 1878, the sultan ruled with a strong hand, lived in state, was prosperous, and had considerable wealth. The principal datus lived at Jolo, and the Sulu forces were united. Jamalul A'lam, the father of the present Sultan of Sulu, remained rich until his death, but subsequent wars reduced the estate of his sons. The separation and dispersion of the datus however, weakened, the Sulus more than any other cause. Each datu began to feel more or less independent of the other and consequently relied solely upon his own fortifications and following. United action became impracticable. Soon the subordinate chiefs also began to feel their importance, gradually asserted their rights and assumed more or less dignity and power in proportion to their prosperity and the following they could command. Jamalul A'lam ruled firmly, had every chief under his control, and held the state intact. Three chiefs outside of his house were sufficient to sign the treaty he made with Spain. No maharajas or hadjis figured prominently in those days, and the panglimas served as state messengers. But as soon as it became known that Jamalul A'lam was dying, a condition bordering on anarchy arose and continued during the sultanate of Badarud Din. Things grew worse during the regency of Datu Aliyud Din, and worse still during the civil strife between the latter and Raja Muda Amirul Kiram. General Arolas and Sultan Harun had to fight every chief in turn and every island by itself. Each chief felt independent of the rest of the country and had his own ideas as to who should be appointed sultan. Each datu was defended by his own men only, and each datu-ship had to meet the Spanish forces by itself unaided. Even Maymabung had to face the mighty foe with forces which could be assembled from the immediate neighborhood only. Small detachments did sometimes reinforce the forts of their neighbors, but the proportion

of help so extended to the actual strength of the forces that could have been united was so insignificant that no account can be taken of such coöperation.

Thus the total or combined strength of Sulu was reduced to small, insignificant, and disunited entities; their power of resistance to outside invasion was diminished, but at the same time the susceptibility of the country to foreign influence became nil. It was an easy matter for General Arolas to defeat each chief alone, but the necessity of fighting every chief in the Sulu Archipelago defeated his purpose and efforts in the end. Unconsciously, Spain brought on an abnormal condition of affairs in Sulu and Mindanao which was extremely difficult to manage and for which she never found the proper remedy.

THE CAUSES OF FAILURE OF THE SPANISH POLICY.

The failure of the Spanish policy in Mindanao and Sulu was due principally to three mistakes: 1, Intolerance and impatience towards the Moros; 2, Non-occupation of the land early with forces sufficient to maintain Spanish supremacy in the south; 3, Failure to rule the people through their chiefs and to give proper respect to native authority. Had Spain exerted more effort and increased the Jolo garrison in 1646 and trusted the charge of this garrison to an able and upright administrator, the fruits of the brilliant conquest of General Corcuera would not have been lost, and in all probability the trouble with Sulu would have been ended before the termination of the seventeenth century. However, weak characters were charged with the management of affairs, and in place of a permanent and strong occupation of the land, insignificant treaties were made with the Sulus from time to time with no intention on the part of Spain of keeping them permanently and with no hope that they would be kept by the Sulus. Such mistakes were frequently repeated and a cruel inhuman strife marked with an astounding profuseness of bloodshed and terrible loss of life and evil of all sorts, was prolonged for the space of three hundred and twenty years without any advantage that is worth considering.

What happened in Sulu occurred in Mindanao, and in consequence of all this, the Moro has been pictured to the outside world as a black devil incarnate, conceived in iniquity and born in mischief, without a human characteristic, barbarous and savage in the extreme. The Moro had no means or chance of pleading his cause before an international court, and his cry could not be heard or registered by a foreign hand or press. He was not met except with a predetermination to fight him. He was not approached except with the intention of sharing his treasure. He was not invited, except to surrender his right of government and no alternative was offered him except tribute or death. It is out of reason to expect such people to abandon their customs, traditions, government, and religion without a struggle. It is out of reason to expect them to yield to threats and be daunted by a bomb-shell shot from a distance. The jungle is thick and extensive, their boats and sails are ready and light; they know the routes of the sea and

can follow the currents of the ocean in the dark as well as in the light. The coasts of Borneo and the Celebes are not too far from them, and living there is as cheap and easy as at home. It is beyond reason to expect that all sultans, datus, and panglimas resign their office, give up their rank and privileges, and be content to plant corn on the hill side or catch fish along the beach. The laws of nature are not ambiguous, and man is after all man, whether his skin be white or brown.

THE EARLY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION OF MINDANAO AND SULU.

Such was the history of Moroland and such was its state of affairs when in May, 1899, our troops were ordered south to relieve the Spanish garrisons in Mindanao and Sulu. The ceremonies which attended the surrender of the Spanish Jolo garrison, the triumphal entrance of our soldiers into the walled town, the lowering of the Spanish flag, the raising of the Stars and Stripes over the old fort of General Arolas, and the quiet march of the Spanish troops down the main street to the pier, were most impressive to say the least. Many Moros had assembled in the public plaza to witness this grand ceremony. To them the scene was beautiful; a little sad but exciting in the extreme. In surmising what thoughts passed at that time through the minds of the Sultan of Sulu and the brother datus Kalbi and Julkarnayn, we do not have to tax our imagination very much. Sighs of relief must have been quite audible throughout the Moro crowd of spectators and lively conjectures must have been indulged in by the masses as to what the new comers would do.

No time, however, was lost by our government in assuring all Moros of our peaceful mission and good intention. Such assurance was merely verbal in Mindanao and Basilan, but in Sulu it took the form of a treaty which General Bates drew with the Sultan of Sulu and other chiefs. The conditions we had to face in the south were absolutely new and different from any thing our government had to deal with before. There was an insurrection in the north, and all the troops were needed there. The Moro people seemed very strange and the country was wholly unknown. A peaceful adjustment of our relations with the Moros was therefore necessary and binding upon the government. From May, 1899, to August, 1903, our garrisons maintained a peaceful occupation of Mindanao and Sulu, and practically left the Moros alone in the management of their internal affairs. The proper authorities, however, took notice of Moro affairs, made some observations and tried to study conditions and formulate an appropriate method for their administration. In September, 1903, all Moro territory in Mindanao and Sulu was organized into one province, the Sulu treaty was revoked, and the present form of government of the Moro Province was inaugurated. The events that followed the establishment of this government are so recent and the period is so short that the subject does not properly admit of academic discussion or historical treatment and does not require a new effort to bring it to public attention.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE MOROS.

Up to September 1, 1903, the relation the Sulus held to the government of the Philippine Islands was determined by treaty. The rights of each party to the treaty were well defined and the terms of the last Spanish treaty of 1878, and those of General Bates's treaty of May 1899, are fully and clearly set forth in the History of Sulu. At the time of Spanish evacuation a considerable part of Moro territory in Mindanao had not been explored. The first white officer who reached the southern shore of lake Lanao was Captain Hagadorn of the 23d U. S. Infantry, who was then stationed at Malabang. The first white officer who crossed that lake by boat from south to north was Captain Pershing, the present General Pershing, Governor of the Moro Province. Spain had never completed the conquest of Moroland. Spain was in control of the sea and governed the external affairs of the Moros as well as those of the whole Philippine Archipelago, but the internal affairs of the Moros were in general not interfered with. Each Moro datuship enjoyed a kind of autonomy and as long as the external affairs of the datuship were not disturbed, the Spanish officials had no cause for interference.

It is clear, therefore, that, strictly speaking, the Moros were no more citizens of the Philippine Islands than the Filipinos are American citizens. Moro datuships actually formed Spanish dependencies which were never administratively incorporated into the general Philippine political organization. The Spanish government of Mindanao was a provisional organization of a quasi-military government of occupation which kept general supervision over these dependencies. It was the desire of Spain to ultimately bring all the Moros into line by incorporating them into the general provincial organization of the Philippine Islands, but her desire was not attained. The inauguration of the present government of the Moro Province was therefore the first bold attempt to break through the fence and take a hand in the administration of Moro internal affairs. This attempt has not yet accomplished much, and the Moros are still outside the fold of the main Philippine family of tribes. They still have their datus and panditas, and they still have their own laws and courts.

PERTINENT CONSIDERATIONS.

It is rather disappointing to read in the report which accompanies the H. R. 22143, known as the Jones' Bill, such inaccurate statement as "the Moros, the most savage of the wild tribes, * * *" Evidently some Congressmen do not know what the Moros are and what they are fighting for. Indeed no one seems to know, even in Manila and Zamboanga, that the Moros have been fighting on the defensive side ever since 1848. Naturally the Moros do not like to change their customs and political organization. They consider these as inalienable rights and privileges. They conceded other rights and other privileges, but the management of their internal affairs by foreigners they feel unable to tolerate. They have, therefore, invariably resisted every effort made for that purpose by either

Spaniards or Americans and invariably their resistance led to hostilities and serious fighting.

The Moros do not consider themselves Filipinos. They have no desire to associate politically with the native Christians: They have no sympathy with the present movement for Philippine independence and certainly have no taste for a democratic form of government. There has never been any love lost between them and the native Christians. During the interval that preceded our occupation of Mindanao no mercy was shown the Christian residents of the Mindanao valley. If American soldiers be withdrawn from the Moro Province the same hostility would no doubt be quickly resumed and the Moros may do the Christians of Mindanao a great deal of harm. The sentiment of the Moros in the District of Zamboanga is very hostile towards the Christians at present. Outside the District of Zamboanga there are no Christians in the Moro Province to count on. The District of Davao and the Sub-District of Dapitan have no bearing on the Moro problem, they are really outside the Moro districts. An independent Philippine government composed of all the Christian provinces as is contemplated by the Jones' Bill would, however, be immeasurably stronger than any state the Moros may be able to organize in the south. The Moros are greatly disunited. There is no community of thought or feeling among the Moro districts. Each district is inhabited by a different tribe and these tribes have never been united. Indeed, there is no district, not even Sulu, which can effect the union of all its datuships. The Moros are really in a pitiful state of political disunion and are actually helpless against modern forces and military organizations. But though it be easy to defeat them in battle, it is a completely different proposition to occupy their land and colonize their country.

The Moros were in a much better state of organization and were better fitted to preserve peace and order in their territory in 1899 than they are now. The Sultan of Sulu was much stronger then than at present. Datu Pedro Cuevas could have ruled Basilan with a firm hand, and Datu Mandi could have governed the whole peninsula of Zamboanga. A strong power was rising in the Mindanao Valley and Datu Ali could have easily brought all the Magindanaw Moros under his sovereignty. He could have easily gotten complete control of all that territory now known as the District of Cotabato, and extending from the neighborhood of Malabang to Sarangani Point. But since 1899 all Moro authority has been crushed. Every strong datu who was living then has either been killed or passed away, and the country is completely disrupted and disorganized.

PART II

The Solution of the Moro Problem.

THE DEFINITION OF THE MORO PROBLEM.

By the Moro problem is meant that method or form of administration by which the Moros and other non-christians who are living among them, can be governed to their best interest and welfare in the most peaceful way possible, and can at the same time be provided with appropriate measures for their gradual advancement in culture and civilization, so that in the course of a reasonable time they can be admitted into the general government of the Philippine Islands as qualified members of a republican national organization. We have not gone to Moroland to exploit the resources of the country nor to rule it for our benefit. Its government is a sacred trust and the principle of "the Philippines for the Filipinos" was meant to apply to Mindanao and Sulu in the same sense as that in which it was applied to the Bisayas and Luzon. In devising a form of government for Moroland we are, therefore, strictly governed by the best interest of the people themselves. The establishment of a peaceful state of affairs and the preservation of the present prosperity of the country become at once our binding obligation and demand of urgent consideration. Nor can we overlook the future progress and development of the people. Moroland is destined to ultimately form one or more provinces which will be integral parts of the general provincial organization of the Philippine Islands, and it is the duty of its present government to so develop its citizens and institutions as to bring about such a transformation and incorporation in due time.

THE BASIC DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION BETWEEN THE MOROS AND THE CHRISTIAN FILIPINOS.

A wide and deep chasm separates the Moros from their Christian neighbors. Marked inequality in culture and radical differences of civilization make it impossible to govern them alike. Two forms of government are at present necessary, one for the Moro and one for the Christian. The Moro has to develop, reform, and rise to the level of the Christian before the two governments can be united or incorporated.

The basic unit of the Philippines governmental organization is a republican municipality. The basic unit of the Moro political organization is a feudal datuship. The differences that exist between these two units are organic and very material. A republican municipal institution presupposes a sufficient degree of intelligence in the community, and implies the recognition by the community of the principle of equal rights to all its members and the public belief

that the just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed and that public office is a trust that should be administered with justice and honesty in the interest of the governed and for their welfare.

The datuship is a crude feudal institution. The datu is God's vicegerent on earth. He is of noble birth and the Prophet's blood runs through his veins. The people owe him allegiance and tribute. His person is sacred and no man can do him bodily harm without incurring God's wrath and terrible punishment in this life and in the life to come. The people are different classes, some have special privileges and may not pay tribute, others are slaves and have less rights and liberties than the free citizens. The great majority of the people can neither read nor write and lack intelligence. Land ownership is not well defined and most of the land is owned by the datu himself. Religion is not separate from the state, the datu is the head of the church and every court sentence should be based on a sacred statute of the Quran. There are no public roads in the datuship, no public treasury; no police force, no standing army, and no public sentiment. Markets are personal property, nothing is held in common by the community except the river, the sea, and the forest.

No wise official would attempt to administer such governmental units alike. It is a physical impossibility which admits no argument. We can no more govern a municipality and a datuship alike than treat and feed a child and an adult alike. Hence the different organization of the Moro Province and the creation of a special legislative council for the purpose of providing appropriate laws and governmental machinery for the datuship. And it is such laws and such machinery as may be proper and applicable to the administration of the affairs of the datuship at present and for its gradual transformation into a municipality in the future that constitutes the knotty solution of the Moro problem. Two considerations are therefore implied in the solution of this problem: 1, adaptability to the present conditions of the datuship; 2, adaptation to a process of gradual development, reformation or transformation of the datuship into a municipality. In discussing means and measures for the government of the Moros we should keep these two considerations constantly in mind.

THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE MORO PROBLEM AND THEIR SOLUTION.

The knotty difficulties which beset the path of the administrator of Moro affairs must necessarily arise from the differences which the constitution of the datuship presents. These differences are: (1) the relation which the datu holds to the people; (2) the inequality of rights among the classes of the people; (3) the ignorance and illiteracy of the people in general; (4) the relation of religion to the state; (5) the lack of title to land and township organization.

1. *The Datu.*

The relation of the datu to his people should not be at present radically changed or unduly disturbed. The datuship should be ruled through its chief.

(A) The datu should be respected and should be recognized as the chief of the datuship because he actually represents the people over whom he rules. His dignity is the dignity of his people and his good-will is theirs. Show disrespect to the datu and the people would feel insulted, honor him and they would be pleased. We can not have good relations with the people unless we gain the datu's good-will beforehand. The people have never been found friendly in any locality in the Moro Province except where the datu has been on good terms with the government, and they are never hostile unless the datu is hostile too. The datu can not be disturbed without disturbing the whole community over whom he rules. Naturally the people are vitally concerned in their chief. He governs their affairs and rules their destinies, and neither party can be disturbed without effect on the other. No impression can reach the people without affecting the datu and no impression can be produced on the datu without affecting the people. The datu should not then be considered an evil incubus imposed on the community, or a foreign obstacle that impedes its administration: He is simply the natural head of the datuship and an inseparable constituent part of the whole.

(B) The datu should further be respected and recognized as the chief of the datuship because he is our best agent for governing his people. The Moro masses are perfect strangers to us. We can not speak their language nor can they speak ours. We do not understand their ways and ideas and they do not understand ours. We can not manage them directly and in person nor do they lie within our immediate reach. We can not rule them without an intermediary and we can not force upon them measures which we can not force upon their datu. Why should we not then accept the natural interagency of the datu and benefit by his position and influence? We can not have another intermediary without rupture and we can not accomplish much good without peace. If we seek the people we can not ignore their head and if we honestly wish them well we can not treat them ill.

The datu may seem to stand between us and the people. He may seem indifferent to our purpose and an obstacle to reform and progress, yet we should still counsel patience and a firm adherence to a policy of peace, perseverance, and persuasion. Ever since 1848 the datu has neither been on the offensive side nor led any active opposition to social reform or progress. We have yet to see the datu attack an American stronghold or keep away from the new market. The datu is indeed the first Moro to put on shoes, buy American candy, and sit in a chair. He supervises the market-place, protects the "tienda," and helps the school. No matter how obdurate he may be in the beginning, once an inch of ground is gained from him, progress follows smoothly and proceeds uninterruptedly at a constantly increasing rate. Peaceful measures bear more fruit in the end. Hos-

tilities pervert the judgement, kill ambition, and greatly retard progress. A hostile Moro is like an angry tiger held at bay. He knows no fear, roars in resentment, and never yields. A friendly Moro is known to be sincere, affectionate, and hospitable. Let the datu alone if you choose, leave him neutral if you can, and the subtle agencies of neighborhood and friendship will as sure as the day follows the night undermine his position, weaken his power, and win over his people. This is not mere theory, for in 1901 and 1902 Moros from all the corners of the Mindanao Valley and the Bay of Sarangani came to Cotabato, laid their troubles before the commanding officer, and sought relief from the injustice of their datus and judges. In an attempt to lighten his burdens, the commanding officer suggested to the principal datus the organization of a district court of three judges representing the three main datuships of the Mindanao Valley to sit in Cotabato at certain dates and hear all Moro cases which he might refer to them for judgement or arbitration. The response was spontaneous, hearty, and prompt. The movement created considerable stir throughout the whole valley and before the month was over the court convened and transacted business with much satisfaction. Hostile, pertinacious, and unapproachable as the Sulus seemed to be, they took advantage of the Jolo court, and often though uninvited, appealed their cases to the commanding officer of the American troops for justice and relief. Arouse the Moro's anger and hostility, and he becomes dangerous, cruel, and treacherous. Cultivate his friendship and you will find him faithful, kind, and tractable. Assure the datu of his position and dignity and he will be your obedient servant and faithful assistant. Let the government help him and strengthen his hand, and both he and the government will profit. The datu will endeavour to improve himself and at the same time carry out the wishes of the government. He would obey directions, adopt progressive policy, and gradually reform his datuship. The people would feel kindly towards the American authorities, accept their example and advice, and gradually imitate their ways and follow their ideas. And having obtained such an attitude of the people toward American authority and institutions, it merely becomes a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate what results the schools and American activities will produce in time in Moroland.

(C) The datu should further be respected and supported because the sooner we help the people to help themselves, the sooner their political salvation comes. The government does not desire to administer Moro affairs for ever. It is the declared policy of the administration to prepare the people for self government. Then the sooner the datu acquires efficiency and the datuship proper organization, the better it is for all parties concerned. We can not instruct the datu unless we employ him, and he can not learn unless he retains his position and exercises his authority. It is an inefficient teacher who does the student's work, and it is an unsuccessful governor who can not leave for the datu the latter's own duties and work. True, the datu must have noble blood, but his office is not a birth right. The Moros select their datus and exercise considerable choice in naming their sultans. In 1888, the council of datus failed to agree and the

seat of the sultanate of Magindanaw remained vacant until 1896. At the latter date the right of Raja Muda Mamaku to succeed to the throne of his father was ignored and a very distant cousin, Manġigin of Sibugay, was selected sultan. Similar reasons marked the civil strife of Sulu in 1886, and peace was not reestablished until 1894, when the present occupant of the supposed throne of Sulu was selected sultan. No Moro chief claims more authority and prerogatives than the Sultan of Sulu, yet he can not appoint a panglima or a maharaja without the consent and approval of the council of state for Sulu. Absolute as the power of the datu may seem, yet tradition and custom have him so limited in the exercise of his office as to necessitate the submission of all questions of public concern to the council of state or the conference of the datuship. Ignorant and simple as the individual Moro may seem, yet he is the most litigious citizen we have seen. He has a strong instinctive sense of right, and an innate demand for justice. Educate him and give him time to develop and you may be greatly surprised to find how democratic his tendencies are.

(D) The datu should further be respected and aided in order to maintain peace and order in the datuship. It is not the personal worth or intelligence of the datu that demands respect. The datu represents a dignified office and a respectful authority. He maintains peace and order and administers to public welfare. True he is not a democrat and is not selected to office on the grounds of merit and personal fitness only, yet he has as much right to his office and title as a European prince or monarch. The republican form of government is not applicable to all peoples in all grades of culture and in all ages. It does not suit such people as the Moros, and it does not apply at once to their form of civilization. It is therefore a serious mistake to look upon datus as undesirable chiefs and hateful autocrats. It is wrong to consider them parasites who sap the vitality of the community and cause its ills and evils. Such ideas and such talk are silly and harmful and invariably bear mischief and lead to trouble. The datu's office is just as sacred and as respectful as that of a republican governor or magistrate. Treat the datu with disrespect and the datuship would be demoralized. Humiliate the chiefs, and chaos would rule the country. The worst evil that rendered Moroland so difficult to manage was the disorder which was wrought by the iron hand of Spain during her three-hundred-year struggle for the conquest of Mindanao and Sulu. Sulu, for instance, was a more or less compact and strong sultanate before 1876. In 1893, General Arolas left it in a desolate and chaotic condition from which it has not yet recovered. In the earlier days of the sultanates of Mindanao and Sulu, the datus were rich and strong and kept peace and order in their respective datuships. The people were prosperous, had better industries, developed greater commerce, and raised more crops. In the latter days of these sultanates, after 1860, in Mindanao, and after 1876, in Sulu, the datus lost power and influence and their respective datuships declined and became disorganized. The country became less peaceful, less prosperous, and less productive; commerce decreased and the national pride and integrity of the people dimin-

ished. A disunited country ruled by numerous petty chiefs is generally torn by dissensions and infested with bandits and robbers. It can not maintain satisfactory relations with the outside world, and can neither keep faith with its allies nor resist its enemies. No better example of this kind can be cited than that of the Lanao region, the most troublesome part of the whole Moro Province. The crying need of that district, in 1902, was order and union. The country had scores of sultans and hundreds of datus, but it had neither organization nor leaders. The government could neither deal with the district as a whole nor reach the majority of its datuships. As the troops advanced they shelled each kuta alone and fought each datuship by itself. The district was thus easily conquered, but its datuships were further disrupted and disorganized. By humiliating the lawful heir of the sultanate of Sulu, Governor Arolas lost control of the whole archipelago and fought years and shed rivers of blood in vain.

(E) The datu should further be respected and the people should be ruled through their chiefs for the sake of reestablishing general peace and for the termination of what seems to be endless hostility and bloodshed. The foremost duty of a government is the maintenance of peace and order. War which fails to reestablish peace and order is evil and destructive. There has been incessant fighting in Moroland for three hundred and thirty five years to no avail, and it is high time we put a stop to further unnecessary war and bloodshed. The Moros are neither monkeys nor beasts of prey. They love their homes and fight for their rights as all brave men do. The fact that Germany and England recognized Spanish sovereignty over Mindanao and Sulu does not mean that the Moros lost their tribal and national rights. Germany and England relinquished their claims for spheres of influence and commercial privileges, but they did not sell Spain the tribal and national rights of the Moros. Spain transferred her sovereignty of Moroland to the United States, but she did not transfer any rights she could not and did not exercise herself. Spain could not transfer to us the internal management of unexplored regions or special privileges which the Moros kept exercising with Spain's knowledge and acquiescence. Having the power to back our action, however, we simply outstripped Spain in claims and in action. We assumed full and complete sovereignty rights over all Moro territory and affairs, and boldly proclaimed these rights to the datus and their people. But neither the datus nor the people were ready to resign their rights in our favor. They stamped us as invaders and looters and felt severely wronged and despotically treated. They could not understand our action or accept our claims. They burned with anger, flamed with rage, and prepared for a determined fight. They tested our arms at Talipaw, Si'it, Bayan, Bakulud, and Sarunayan and failed. They hid in the caves of Pata and scaled the inaccessible cliffs of Mount Dahu, but the earth seemed unable to hide them and physical means failed to protect them. Like destiny, the American arm reached them wherever they went and the wilderness afforded them no shelter. Daunted and worn out, they lie at present prostrate and inactive, but their hearts and souls remain unreconciled. Such policy seems unusually cruel, though its declared motives are exceedingly

benevolent. If, however, within a reasonable time we bring all Moros into one peaceful, united, and organized state, improve their civilization, develop their resources, and raise them to the social level of their Christian neighbors, no one in the whole wide world would stop to find fault with this policy or blame it for its cruelty. But in case we leave the Moros to their destiny and withdraw our forces and protection from Mindanao and Sulu, no nation under the sky would justify our action or refrain from a scathing criticism of this policy. This is a fact worthy of consideration and a question of great moment, respecting which both Congress and the nation should halt and think before action.

Force is not a desirable agent for peace and benevolence. Some fighting might have been necessary at times, but it certainly is unnecessary all the time. Granting its necessity in former years, we surely feel it is time to try something else. Too much blood has already been spilled and lo! it crieth from the ground for a change of policy and for nobler measures and means. Can't human capacity be fathomed and the laws of nature be studied and obeyed? Half civilized as the Moro is, he is not yet free from savage instincts and barbarous tendencies. An angry man is always half savage, but the angry Moro may by right exceed this limit. Why should he not then resent force when force is applied in his case on the ground of incapacity and savagery? Can a tiger be struck with a stick and be expected to hold his patience and peace? And knowing the nature of the beast as we do, do we try to tame him with a stick or with a piece of meat?

Why should a Moro be considered ignorant and child-like and yet be expected to think, act, and respond as a full grown man? How can we divest the Moro of his right to government and property, and yet expect him to yield and return thanks for an unprecedented favor he may thus receive? The Moro is simply human and should receive just and humane treatment. He is child-like, and should be gently treated. Take him by his right arm and lead him on, and he will soon write a different history on the shores of Sulu and the hills of Mindanao.

The relation the government holds to the datu is paramount in all matters pertaining to Moro affairs and touching upon the solution of the Moro problem. In case of discord one reason or another may be given by the datu in defense of his action or in support of his claim, but the real motive for his action and the determining factor of his policy is always one, and only one; *his position and his power*. It worries him in the day and keeps him awake at night. "Our customs and our religion please respect and do not change." This they ask on coming in and going out, they repeat it morning, noon, and evening; today, tomorrow, and whenever we meet. They think of it when they see a steamer or hear a launch whistle; in sight of the town, in the governor's office, and on leaving the town. I used to wonder, in 1901, what can this mystery be! What customs were they so particular about! Who interferes with their religion and what excites this fear! But when the time for the change approached, every one could plainly see what they meant, except the hope-

lessly blind. Let the datu's mind rest assured as to what his position and power will be and the questions of slavery, nobility, equality of rights, building public works, constructing public roads, maintaining police force, establishing schools, securing labor, and acquiring homesteads, all can be solved and dispensed with in a very short while. Datu Ali did not fight on account of water channel rights nor did the Sulus aim to defend one renegade named Pala at the risk of losing a thousand souls. They thought of their power and their rights with which they could not part without an effort and a struggle.

2. The Inequality of Rights Among the People.

The Moro community is made up of four classes: The datu class, or nobles; the privileged-class, or free citizens; the subjects of the datu; and the slaves. Moro law recognizes these classes and differentiates between crime committed against one class or the other. Slavery does, no doubt, still exist, but it is of a very mild character and is in the majority of cases more like peonage than slavery. This apparent gross inequality of rights among the people has considerably diminished since American occupation and is gradually dying away. It should, as a rule, be completely disregarded for it will not in itself offer any more serious difficulties in the future. Slavery has been legislated against and its commission has become an acknowledged crime. The nobility is actually passing away and wealth is already superseding blood. People who could sell datus and rajamudas as slaves will not be slow in casting nobility aside and in giving men their personal worth and individual merit. Many warriors and subordinate officers have overpowered their datus and ruled their communities. Personal valor and influence is always foremost in the Moro's own consideration.

3. The Illiteracy of the People.

The general impression that the public has of the Moros is very incorrect. A great measure of unfavorable criticism was made by persons unduly influenced by the Moros' hostility and cruelties in time of war. The Moros are Mohammedans in religion and Malayans in customs. They do not know either Spanish or English and are, therefore, very difficult to communicate with and understand. The majority of Americans and Spaniards who came in contact with them had neither respect nor sympathy for anything that was not American or European and unjustly looked upon them as savages and fanatics. Careful observation, however, finds them rather civilized and very much like the provincial Christian Filipinos. Remove hostility, and the thin veneer of religion and dress, and the Moro is in every respect a Filipino. He makes a good friend and a good pupil and is more industrious than the average Christian.

The Moros were richer, better organized, and more civilized sixty years ago than now. The results of the Spanish wars with Sulu and Mindanao reduced their strength very considerably and wrought havoc with their institutions. Disorganized and demoralized as they are now, they still retain signs of former progress and better days.

We find a considerable number among them who can read and write and have a distinct desire to learn and improve. Thousands can read and write in Arabic characters and stand ready to convey knowledge and learning to the masses. They have books, courts, judges, and a governmental system and, with adequate effort, well developed and civilized communities can at once be organized among them, if properly qualified American officers are available for such work. Strictly speaking, the masses are ignorant and illiterate, but there is sufficient intelligence among the members of the better classes to enable the government to make a beginning at least, and the future is no doubt promising. Schools have been established among the Moros with undoubted success. Moro students are fairly apt and capable of development and their education can follow the same general lines as those adopted for the education of the Christian tribes further north. However, having no means of communicating with the Moros except through their own dialects, the knowledge of the Arabic system of writing and of the local dialects become necessary as qualifications for office and as part of the curriculum of the primary schools.

4. *The Question of Religion.*

Religion as a governmental difficulty can easily be brushed aside; yet indeed it can be encouraged and promoted to the advantage of either side, the government and the people. Religion has never been a cause of hostility between Americans and Moros. Datu Utu and his whole household knew I was a Christian, yet they took considerable pleasure in my attendance at some of their religious ceremonies and festivities. Datu Mastura gave me free access to his whole library most of which were religious manuscripts and books on law and magic. There was no book on religion, law, or history in the possession of Datu Ali that I could not get, and the Sultan of Sulu placed his precious Luntar in my hands. The Moros have not that bigotry and religious fanaticism which we observe in India, Western Asia, and Africa. They do not understand the principal doctrines of Mohammedanism, and have so little religion at heart that it is impossible for them to get enthusiastic and fanatic on this ground. They do not know the five prayers and seldom enter a mosque. Some of the panditas attend the Friday service once a week and pray for the Sultan and the whole nation. "Juramentados" are not religious fanatics. Not one juramentado in ten could say his prayers or knew the doctrines of his creed. There has been no greater misunderstanding by Spaniards and Americans on any one Moro subject than on this—the juramentado question. The juramentado is not actuated by a religious feeling. It is fierce patriotism that excites his rashness and provokes his craziness. A juramentado's state of mind during the execution of his purpose is a condition of frenzy or temporary insanity closely allied in its nature to that of being amuck. A man who runs amuck in a manner avenges himself and his personal grievances, but the juramentado avenges his people and his chief. His chief's call for vengeance rings in his ears and he immediately comes forward as the hero and avenger of the datanship and gets ready for

his treacherous fray. No one, however, faces death without religious wakening and fear, and the reckless juramentado can not advance towards his grave without performing the last rites of his creed. He would not otherwise be allowed to proceed even if he wanted to. Religion plays a secondary role in this case and no blame can attach to the juramentado's creed. Let the Moro be heathen and he will "go juramentado" on the strength of his faith in wooden idols before he yields to a master or gives up his home. The juramentado is a forerunner of hostilities and an evil sign of the times.

5. Land Ownership and Township Organization.

Granted a condition of peace in the datuship, it becomes the duty of the government to survey the land and grant titles or allot homesteads to all worthy members of the datuship. The Moro township is a settled agricultural community which has tilled the soil it occupies for years and ages. Man's natural right to the land he owns is not derived from a mere paper certificate, but from actual possession and tilling of the soil. Moro datos do not issue titles for land, nor did Spain attempt any action in this regard. But the present government can, and the sooner it acts the sooner the Moros start to improve their land. In many instances the land is claimed by the datu, the tenant being his former slave. A readjustment of property rights will then be found necessary and each person should get his just dues. All this can be properly and satisfactorily arranged without rupture or serious trouble. There is land enough for every Moro, all that is required is the government's prompt action and strong interest in this matter.

As soon as the Moros own titles to land and value property, a desire for improvement begins and a better home feeling is fostered. The fruits of their labor become secure and a sense of thrift and business quickly develops. Mutual aid and mutual benefit soon give rise to a healthy public sentiment that grows with the advance of education and spreads to other activities, and the reformed Moro, conscious of his rights and awake to his interests, takes a new pride in his township and works for its advancement.

The Most Basic Administrative Measures Calculated to Effect the Solution of the Moro Problem.

THE RECOGNITION OF THE DATU.

In applying the principles discussed above to the actual management of Moro affairs we declare that the most basic step that should be taken by the government of the Moro Province is the establishment of order, real actual order that proceeds from responsible authority. The government can not deal with a mob. It can not transact business with an irresponsible chief. The datu should be recognized as a regular officer of state. He should be treated and respected in a manner that makes him know and feel that he

is a part of the government. He should be assured of his position and should then be held responsible for peace and order in the datuship. By advice and practical instruction, if necessary, the district governor should see to it that the datu understands his duty and enforces his authority. The datu should be obeyed by his subjects and the laws of the datuship should be respected by the community. Here lies the whole secret of success in the administration of Moro affairs. If the datu is not treated as a responsible officer of state, or if the people feel under no obligation to respect him and obey the law, nothing else can be accomplished. The whole frame of government would fall to the ground and the policy would utterly fail. A mere ordinary defect in the character of the datu, the displeasure of a minority faction of the datuship, the jealousy of other chiefs, are all minor considerations and mere trifles as compared to the fundamental principle of responsible authority and obedience to law. Whether the datu be allowed all his former prerogatives and powers or not, whether the datuship be taxed or not, whether the Moros be disarmed or not, are secondary questions and less essential matters. It is desirable to get as many concessions from the datu as it is possible to get without enmity or rupture, but the principle of responsible authority should be secured first, at any cost. Given a responsible and efficient datu and a law abiding community, the government can afford to wait for further developments and for more progress. What is the use of negotiating with the sultan when he disclaims his responsibility for the action of a panglima and can not vouch for the obedience of a township? Establish his responsibility first, then negotiate with him; insure his authority next, then depend upon him. It is ridiculous to do otherwise or begin somewhere else. This is the main foundation of governmental structure and the corner stone of future success. A weak sultan can be helped, an ignorant chief can be instructed, but an irresponsible, unrecognized datu is a nuisance and a treacherous foe.

The Moros are an unshepherded flock. The urgent need of Moroland is order and obedience to law. The number of datus in the district is immaterial, the inequality of the datuships is unimportant, but peace and order determine failure or success. District governors can afford to give this matter their time, talent and attention, and, when necessary, they should back moral pressure with force.

THE ORGANIZATION OF MORO COURTS.

Having established datuships, it next becomes the duty of the government to regulate and legalize their courts. The people will keep up their customs and continue to seek justice as they are used to unless another provision is made for that purpose and is put in force. It would be unwise to declare the former system null and illegal and leave the people unprovided and unprotected. The Moro generally associates the office of governor with that of judge. The datu is always the supreme court of the datuship. Having established datuships, the people would naturally expect the datu to act as courts unless a special provision is made for the latter. In Sulu the sultan is the head of the state and the church and the supreme

court of the archipelago. The state is divided into districts each of which is governed by a *panglima*, and subdistricts each of which is governed by a *maharajc*. The panglimas and maharajas act as judges as well as officers of state—the maharajas forming the lower courts and the panglimas the higher courts; other subordinate officers of state act as courts also. In Magindanaw the sultan claims the highest authority of state, church, and court, but he seldom exercises the office of priest or judge in person. The pandita class is so well developed and organized as to perform these offices. After reaching a certain grade of learning, the pandita or priest is raised by the datu to the rank of judge (*datu-kali*) and he then officiates as judge for the district to which he is appointed. The office of sultan or datu is chiefly administrative and ministers of state (*wazir*) are appointed to assist the sultan or datu in conducting the executive department of the sultanate or datuship. In times past the sultanates of Sulu and Magindanaw were better organized than at present. Besides separate departments for administration, justice, and the church, they had others for war, the navy, and the treasury. But the subsequent decline and demoralization of these sultanates, which were caused by Spain's aggression, has reduced their organization to the present crude form. The vestiges of the former state can, however, be still recognized as nominal titles given to some members of the nobility and officers of state like *amil-bahar* (admiral), *raja-lawut* (minister of marine), *bandahara* (treasurer), *raja-muda* (heir apparent), etc., etc.

The organization of Moro courts should not, therefore, meet with any opposition from either the people or the datu, for they are accustomed to them and can easily adjust themselves to minor changes, if there be any. Indeed the Moros in general would welcome such a measure and would rather have it than not. They would not feel that the organization of the datuship is complete without it.

The establishment of Moro courts (one or more for each datuship) is a measure of considerable significance. It is necessary for the present welfare of the datuship and is the most effective means of introducing reforms. These courts are generally filled by the best talent of the community and exercise immeasurable influence over the masses. Through them new laws and regulations can from time to time be conveniently introduced and a strong factor in the evolution of the datuship can thus be secured.

Crude as the Moro codes of law are, they can be easily modified and revised. Simple and brief as they may be, they form a convenient basis for a start. The Moros who officiate in these courts would soon encounter new conditions and develop new ideas, and will be themselves asking for more laws and instruction and, later urge revision and reform. Comparing the position of a datu with that of a municipal president, the Moro datuship-court would be considered as at least on a level with the justice of the peace court, and should have equal scope and jurisdiction, if not more.

Besides datuship courts, each one of the four Moro districts should have one district court. Each district court should be com-

posed of three judges or more, according to the number of political parties or important datuships in the district. These courts should adjudicate cases appealed from the datanship courts and all cases arising between members of different datuships. These courts may act as boards of arbitration for the datuships and as councils of advice for the district. Many questions of custom, usages, and ancient boundaries can not be better handled than by such courts. The natural effect of these courts would be to modify the authority of the datu and to check his tendency to arbitrariness and absolutism. They would gradually take away from the datu all powers and prerogatives from which he may need to be divested in order to bring him down to the level of the municipal president. These courts further form a strong tie between the people and the district government and gradually blend all district elements into one government. The decisions of the district court may be reviewed, in some instances, by the court of first instance, and, in others, by the district governor.

THE ORGANIZATION OF DATUSHIP COUNCILS.

The datanship varies in size. In some cases it is small and is restricted to one or a few settlements. In other cases it covers a large district and includes many settlements. The smaller datanship exists chiefly in the Lanao District, while the larger one prevails in Magindanaw and Sulu. The latter type is far more common and represents the standard datanship with which we have to deal. Such datanship presents two significant facts for consideration. First, the settlements are too many and too far apart to admit of being directly and adequately governed by one chief and one court. Second, the history of each settlement is generally found to have become so intimately associated with its local or subordinate chief as to render his continuation in office a necessary and a potent factor for peace and for the welfare of the community. As a rule, the local chief has a firmer hold on his settlement than the datu or sultan. In some cases the local chief represents the formerly independent head of that settlement and his relation to his people is naturally very intimate and strong. For the same reasons which were advanced in the case of datu, such local or subordinate chiefs can not be ignored. They should have a place in the government of the datanship and should be kept in political relation to their settlements. The distance of these settlements from the headquarters of the datanship render it further imperative that local chiefs be kept in power and be admitted into the official family of the datanship.

These conditions strongly suggest the formation of a datanship council which would hold the same relation to the datanship that the municipal council holds to the municipality. Such a council would provide proper official positions for the subordinate chiefs and would fit admirably into the general plan of the gradual evolution or transformation of the datanship into a municipality. The datu would naturally be the president of the datanship council and each subordinate chief a councilor who would represent the datu within his settlement and thus remain in power.

The dataship council may serve another excellent purpose. On general principles the datu should not be allowed to exercise autocratic powers if it can be helped. He should not be the sole legislator and executive officer of the dataship. It would be a great step forward to limit his office to executive functions and to transfer the legislative power to a council. The organization of a dataship council accomplishes this result at once. By the nature of its existence such a council would assume general control over legislation and taxation and would check the datu's autocratic tendencies along these lines. Sooner or later it would issue ordinances and regulations for the dataship, enact police laws, and make assessments for public works. It would provide for schools, roads, markets, irrigation ditches, etc., and gradually control all the activities of the dataship. As a matter of fact, the datu always consults the subordinate chiefs in matters of general interest and importance. The establishment of such a council can not then offend him much. Councils are old institutions of Moroland and their renewal should not disturb its peace. This council in particular would convey to the Moro mind nothing more than an excellent reorganization and a desirable renewal of the old custom of the land. Well nursed by a capable district governor and carried to a fair degree of efficiency, this measure would, in a reasonable time, reduce the dataship to the status of a municipality whose council is appointive instead of elective. This in itself would be a mark of considerable progress and its further development to an elective municipality is a matter of course that is not difficult to foresee.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

Well organized dataships properly provided with Moro courts and dataship councils mark the main basic structure on which rests the whole solution of the Moro problem. A Moro community thus organized can at once be admitted into the general family of civilized Filipino tribes and may in a short time occupy a fairly respectable position in the fellowship of nations.

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to work out a detailed and complete organization for every district of the Moro Province. This needs more time and space than is available at present. Further, a complete organization in this case is a process of growth or development which comes step by step and which can neither be foreseen, planned nor put into effect in a day or a year. No attempt will, therefore, be made here to go beyond the above basic considerations and brief outlines. Local conditions may in some cases need modification or slight departure from the general rule; the personalities of different datu and the tempers of different communities may require different methods of action; additional measures may be needed in Sulu to meet special conditions that do not exist elsewhere; all these and other possible exceptions have to be left to the resourcefulness of the proper authorities to meet as they arise.

A dataship blessed with peace and order is bound to develop. The datu would follow the leadership of the district governor. The


datuship council would organize police force, build markets and public roads, establish schools, and provide revenues. The Moro judges would study American laws and gradually reform their courts and codes. The individual Moro would find himself well protected and would become more thrifty and intelligent. Moved by a natural tendency to imitate superior civilization, he would unconsciously reform his customs and home life and gradually acquire American ideas and new ambitions. An enlightened Moro community, wisely guided by efficient American officials, would undoubtedly work out its own destiny, and following the natural law of growth and development would gradually rise in wealth and culture to the level of a democratic municipality.

The establishment of local government or datuships for the Moros is a most difficult task. It requires intimate acquaintance with and thorough knowledge of men and places and affairs. To administer the affairs of a civilized community like one's own town or county requires talent and ingenuity above that possessed by the average man. But to study, understand, organize and then administer a community of foreign people speaking a foreign language and possessing different customs, ideas and laws requires much more talent and ingenuity. To be able to do the work of a governor of a district in the Moro Province at this stage of its organization requires, besides the usual qualifications for such office, considerable study, practical research work and much perseverance. A district governor ought to know the customs and manners of the people, their history and their relations to their neighbors, their written and unwritten laws, their national organization and their racial limitations, and above all, their language. A district official can never be worthy of his office unless he can read and write the language of the community where he holds office and be able to converse with the natives in their own tongue with ease and facility. Competent men of such ability and such qualification are more than rare. They can not be found any where. Such men have to acquire their knowledge on the ground. They have to live and work for months and years among the people over whom they are expected to rule. The government of the Moro Province should have provided for such preparation for office at the time of its creation, for upon such men and their ability to do their work well, depends the success of the establishment of Moro local government. Too much stress can not be laid on this point, for a great part of the solution of the Moro problem depends upon the personality of the American officials themselves and their ability to handle the Moro community.

In conclusion it may be briefly said that in our conduct of Moro affairs we are bound to follow one of two courses. We have to either be tolerant and accept present conditions and institutions as they are and gradually reform them, or be intolerant and introduce radical changes from the start. The first course begins with amity and proceeds with patience and makes slow but permanent progress with telling effect. The second course is bound to begin with enmity and proceed with opposition every step of the way. The latter course has been tried for over three hundred years. History has

declared its failure and humanity has condemned its principles. The growth of nations, like that of individuals, is governed by natural laws and can not advance by leaps and bounds. Reformation can be fostered by patient instruction and good example, but it can not be forced into being by command and threats. A few evil national customs may have to be checked by force, but force applied as the sole agent of national reform is cruel and harmful.

It, therefore, behooves us to accept present conditions as they are and move ahead with strong hopes and good wish to all men. It is our duty to build before we destroy. Let us bury all past troubles and grievances and lose no time on trifles. We are not responsible for the sins of past ages and mountains of duties lie ahead of us.



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